Combat stress reaction

Image from World War I taken in an Australian dressing station near Ypres in 1917. The wounded soldier in the lower left of the photo has a dazed thousand-yard stare, a frequent symptom of "shell-shock".Combat stress reaction (CSR), is a term used within the military to describe acute behavioural disorganisation seen by medical personnel as a direct result of the trauma of war. Also known as "combat fatigue", it has some overlap with the diagnosis of acute stress reaction used in civilian psychiatry. Historically, it has some link to shell shock, and can sometimes precursor post-traumatic stress disorder.

Combat stress reaction is an acute reaction including a range of behaviours resulting from the stress of battle which decrease the combatant's fighting efficiency. The most common symptoms are fatigue, slower reaction times, indecision, disconnection from one's surroundings, and inability to prioritize. Combat stress reaction is generally short-term and should not be confused with acute stress disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, or other long-term disorders attributable to combat stress, although any of these may commence as a combat stress reaction.

The ratio of stress casualties to battle casualties varies with the intensity of the fighting, but with intense fighting it can be as high as 1:1. In low-level conflicts it can drop to 1:10 (or less).[citation needed]

In World War I, shell shock was considered a psychiatric illness resulting from injury to the nerves during combat. The horrors of trench warfare meant that about 10% of the fighting soldiers were killed (compared to 4.5% during World War II) and the total proportion of troops who became casualties (killed or wounded) was 56%[citation needed]. Whether a shell-shock sufferer was considered "wounded" or "sick" depended on the circumstances. The large proportion of World War I veterans in the European population meant that the symptoms were common to the culture. {| class="toc" id="toc"

Contents
[hide] *1 PIE principles
 * 2 Between the wars
 * 3 World War II
 * 3.1 American
 * 3.2 British
 * 3.3 Canadian
 * 3.4 Germans
 * 3.5 Finns
 * 4 Post-World War II developments
 * 4.1 Peacekeeping stresses
 * 5 Signs and symptoms
 * 5.1 Fatigue related symptoms
 * 5.2 Autonomic arousal
 * 5.2.1 Battle casualty rates
 * 6 Pathophysiology
 * 6.1 SNS Activation
 * 6.2 General Adaptive Syndrome
 * 7 Treatment
 * 7.1 BICEPS
 * 7.1.1 Brevity
 * 7.1.2 Immediacy
 * 7.1.3 Centrality/Contact
 * 7.1.4 Expectancy
 * 7.1.5 Proximity
 * 7.1.6 Simplicity
 * 7.2 Predeployment Preparation
 * 7.2.1 Screening
 * 7.2.2 Cohesion
 * 7.2.3 Training
 * 8 Treatment Results
 * 9 Controversy
 * 10 See also
 * 11 References
 * 11.1 Notes
 * 11.2 Further reading
 * 12 External links
 * }

PIE principles
The PIE principles were in place for the "not yet diagnosed nervous" (NYDN) cases: United States medical officer Thomas W. Salmon is often quoted as the originator of these PIE principles. However, his real strength came from going to Europe and learning from the Allies and then instituting the lessons. By the end of the war, Salmon had set up a complete system of units and procedures that was then the "world’s best practice".[citation needed] After the war he maintained his efforts in educating society and the military. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his contributions.[1]
 * Proximity – treat the casualties close to the front and within sound of the fighting
 * Immediacy – treat them without delay and not wait until the wounded were all dealt with
 * Expectancy – ensure that everyone had the expectation of their return to the front after a rest and replenishment

The effectiveness of the PIE approach has not been confirmed by studies of CSR, and there is some evidence that it is not effective in preventing PTSD.[2]

The US services now use the more recently developed BICEPS principles:
 * Brevity
 * Immediacy
 * Centrality or Contact
 * Expectancy
 * Proximity
 * Simplicity

Between the wars
The British government produced a Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into "Shell-Shock" which was published in 1922. Recommendations from this included:
 * In forward areas
 * No soldier should be allowed to think that loss of nervous or mental control provides an honourable avenue of escape from the battlefield, and every endeavour should be made to prevent slight cases leaving the battalion or divisional area, where treatment should be confined to provision of rest and comfort for those who need it and to heartening them for return to the front line.


 * In neurological centres
 * When cases are sufficiently severe to necessitate more scientific and elaborate treatment they should be sent to special Neurological Centres as near the front as possible, to be under the care of an expert in nervous disorders. No such case should, however, be so labelled on evacuation as to fix the idea of nervous breakdown in the patient’s mind.


 * In base hospitals
 * When evacuation to the base hospital is necessary, cases should be treated in a separate hospital or separate sections of a hospital, and not with the ordinary sick and wounded patients. Only in exceptional circumstances should cases be sent to the United Kingdom, as, for instance, men likely to be unfit for further service of any kind with the forces in the field. This policy should be widely known throughout the Force.


 * Forms of treatment
 * The establishment of an atmosphere of cure is the basis of all successful treatment, the personality of the physician is, therefore, of the greatest importance. While recognising that each individual case of war neurosis must be treated on its merits, the Committee are of opinion that good results will be obtained in the majority by the simplest forms of psycho-therapy, i.e., explanation, persuasion and suggestion, aided by such physical methods as baths, electricity and massage. Rest of mind and body is essential in all cases.
 * The committee are of opinion that the production of hypnoidal state and deep hypnotic sleep, while beneficial as a means of conveying suggestions or eliciting forgotten experiences are useful in selected cases, but in the majority they are unnecessary and may even aggravate the symptoms for a time.
 * They do not recommend psycho-analysis in the Freudian sense.
 * In the state of convalescence, re-education and suitable occupation of an interesting nature are of great importance. If the patient is unfit for further military service, it is considered that every endeavour should be made to obtain for him suitable employment on his return to active life.


 * Return to the fighting line
 * Soldiers should not be returned to the fighting line under the following conditions:-
 * (1) If the symptoms of neurosis are of such a character that the soldier cannot be treated overseas with a view to subsequent useful employment.
 * (2) If the breakdown is of such severity as to necessitate a long period of rest and treatment in the United Kingdom.
 * (3) If the disability is anxiety neurosis of a severe type.
 * (4) If the disability is a mental breakdown or psychosis requiring treatment in a mental hospital.
 * It is, however, considered that many of such cases could, after recovery, be usefully employed in some form of auxiliary military duty.

Part of the concern was that many British veterans were receiving pensions and had long-term disabilities. By 1939, some 120,000 British ex-servicemen had received final awards for primary psychiatric disability or were still drawing pensions – about 15% of all pensioned disabilities – and another 44,000 or so ... were getting pensions for ‘soldier’s heart’ or Effort Syndrome. There is, though, much that statistics do not show, because in terms of psychiatric effects, pensioners were just the tip of a huge iceberg."[3] War correspondent Philip Gibbs wrote: Something was wrong. They put on civilian clothes again and looked to their mothers and wives very much like the young men who had gone to business in the peaceful days before August 1914. But they had not come back the same men. Something had altered in them. They were subject to sudden moods, and queer tempers, fits of profound depression alternating with a restless desire for pleasure. Many were easily moved to passion where they lost control of themselves, many were bitter in their speech, violent in opinion, frightening.[3] One British writer between the wars wrote: There should be no excuse given for the establishment of a belief that a functional nervous disability constitutes a right to compensation. This is hard saying. It may seem cruel that those whose sufferings are real, whose illness has been brought on by enemy action and very likely in the course of patriotic service, should be treated with such apparent callousness. But there can be no doubt that in an overwhelming proportion of cases, these patients succumb to ‘shock’ because they get something out of it. To give them this reward is not ultimately a benefit to them because it encourages the weaker tendencies in their character. The nation cannot call on its citizens for courage and sacrifice and, at the same time, state by implication that an unconscious cowardice or an unconscious dishonesty will be rewarded.[3]

American
At the outbreak of World War II most in the United States military had forgotten the treatment lessons of World War I. Screening of applicants was initially rigorous but experience eventually showed it to not have great predictive power.

The US entered the war in December 1941. It was not until November 1943 that a psychiatrist was added to the table of organization of each division, and this policy was not implemented in the Mediterranean Theatre until March 1944. By 1943 the US Army was using the term "exhaustion" as the initial diagnosis of psychiatric cases and the general principles of military psychiatry were being used. General Patton's slapping incident was in part the spur to institute forward treatment for the Italian invasion of September 1943. The importance of unit cohesion and membership of a group as a protective factor emerged.

Airmen flew far more often in the Southwest Pacific than in Europe, and although rest time in Australia was scheduled, there was no fixed number of missions that would produce transfer out of combat, as was the case in Europe. Coupled with the monotonous, hot, sickly environment, the result was bad morale that jaded veterans quickly passed along to newcomers. After a few months, epidemics of combat fatigue would drastically reduce the efficiency of units. The men who had been at jungle airfields longest, the flight surgeons reported, were in bad shape:
 * Many have chronic dysentery or other disease, and almost all show chronic fatigue states. . . .They appear listless, unkempt, careless, and apathetic with almost masklike facial expression. Speech is slow, thought content is poor, they complain of chronic headaches, insomnia, memory defect, feel forgotten, worry about themselves, are afraid of new assignments, have no sense of responsibility, and are hopeless about the future."[4]

British
Unlike the Americans, the British leaders firmly held the lessons of World War I. It was estimated aerial bombardment would kill up to 35,000 a day but the entire Blitz killed 40,000. The expected torrent of civilian mental breakdown did not occur. The Government turned to World War I doctors for advice on those who did have problems. The PIE principles were generally used. However, in the British Army, since most of the World War I doctors were too old for the job, young, analytically trained psychiatrists were employed. Army doctors "appeared to have no conception of breakdown in war and its treatment, though many of them had served in the 1914-1918 war." The first Middle East Force psychiatric hospital was set up in 1942. With D-Day for the first month there was a policy of holding casualties for only 48 hours before they were sent back over the Channel. This went firmly against the expectancy principle of PIE.[3]

Canadian
The Canadian Army recognized combat stress reaction as "Battle Exhaustion" during the Second World War and classified it as a separate type of combat wound. Historian Terry Copp has written extensively on the subject.[5] In Normandy, "The infantry units engaged in the battle also experienced a rapid rise in the number of battle exhaustion cases with several hundred men evacuated due to the stress of combat. Regimental Medical Officers were learning that neither elaborate selection methods nor extensive training could prevent a considerable number of combat soldiers from breaking down."[6]

Germans
In an interview, Dr Rudolf Brickenstein stated that: ... he believed that there were no important problems due to stress breakdown since it was prevented by the high quality of leadership. But, he added, that if a soldier did break down and could not continue fighting, it was a leadership problem, not one for medical personnel or psychiatrists. Breakdown (he said) usually took the form of unwillingness to fight or cowardice.[7] However as the war progressed there was a profound rise in stress casualties from 1% of hospitalisations in 1935 to 6% in 1942.[citation needed] Another German psychiatrist reported after the war that during the last two years, about a third of all hospitalisations at Ensen were due to war neurosis. It is probable that there was both less of a true problem and less perception of a problem.[7]

In his history of the pre-Nazi Freikorps paramilitary organizations, "Vanguard of Nazism", historian Robert GL Waite describes some of the emotional effects of World War I on German troops, and refers to a phrase he attributes to Goering: men who could not become "de-brutalized".[8]

Finns
The Finnish attitudes to "war neurosis" were especially tough. Psychiatrist Harry Federley, who was the head of the Military Medicine, considered shell shock as a sign of weak character and lack of moral fibre. His treatment for war neurosis was simple: the patients were to be bullied and harassed as long as they were unwilling to return to front line service.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;">[citation needed]

Earlier, during the Winter War, several Finnish machine gun operators on the Karelian Isthmus theatre became mentally unstable after repelling several unsuccessful Soviet human wave assaults on fortified Finnish positions.

Post-World War II developments
Simplicity was added to the PIE principles by the Israelis. This principle meant that treatment should be brief and supportive and could be provided by those without sophisticated training.

Peacekeeping stresses
Peacekeeping provides its own stresses with its emphasis on rules of engagement providing a containment of the roles for which soldiers are trained. Causes include witnessing or experiencing the following: A notable case of CSR in peacekeeping operations is that of Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the UN-run operation in Rwanda, UNAMIR. Unable to intervene to prevent the ensuing Rwandan Genocide, Major-General Dallaire was forced to watch as almost a million Tutsis were brutally killed. On return to Canada, feeling that he had not done enough to halt the genocide, and haunted by the images of dismembered victims, Dallaire contemplated suicide; in June 2000 he was found in a public park near Ottawa's Rideau Canal, drunk and overdosing from anti-depressant medication.<sup class="Template-Fact" style="white-space: nowrap;">[citation needed] This very public incident highlighted the impact of difficult sub-combat operations on soldiers and awoke the public's awareness to CSR (or, as it is often referred to by the public, post-traumatic stress disorder).
 * Constant tension and threat of conflict.
 * Threat of land mines and booby traps.
 * Close contact with dead people and the severely injured.
 * Deliberate maltreatment and atrocities, possibly involving civilians.
 * Cultural issues, e.g. male dominant attitudes towards women in different cultures.
 * Separation and home issues.
 * Risk of disease including HIV.
 * Threat of exposure to toxic agents.
 * Mission problems.
 * Return to service.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-8">[9]

Signs and symptoms
Combat stress reaction symptoms align with the symptoms also found in psychological trauma, which is closely related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). CSR differs from PTSD (among other things) in that a PTSD diagnosis requires a duration of symptoms over one month, which CSR does not.

Fatigue related symptoms
The most common stress reactions include:

Battle casualty rates
The ratio of stress casualties to battle casualties varies with the intensity of the fighting. With intense fighting it can be as high as 1:1. In low-level conflicts it can drop to 1:10 (or less). Modern warfare embodies the principles of continuous operations with an expectation of higher combat stress casualties.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-web.archive.org_9-0">[10]

The World War II European Army rate of stress casualties of 101:1,000 troops per annum is biased by data from the last years of the war where the rates were low.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Gabriel_10-0">[11]

SNS Activation
Many of the symptoms initially experienced by CSR sufferers are effects of an extended activation of the human body's fight-or-flight response. The fight-or-flight response involves a general sympathetic nervous system discharge in reaction to a perceived stress and prepares the body to fight or run from the threat causing the stress.Catecholamine hormones, such as adrenaline or noradrenaline, facilitate immediate physical reactions associated with a preparation for violent muscular action. While the flight-or-fight-response normally resolves with the removal of the threat, combat zones lead to extended life threatening situations in which soldiers are unable to neutralize the threat and are in a state of constant acute stress.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-gleitman_11-0">[12]

General Adaptive Syndrome
The process in which the human body responds to extended stress is known as general adaptive syndrome. After the initial fight-or-flight response, the body becomes more resistant to stress in an attempt to dampen the sympathetic nervous response and return to homeostasis. During this period of resistance, physical and mental symptoms of CSR may be drastically reduced as the body attempts to cope with the stress. In cases of long combat involvement, the body may not be able to effectively return to homeostasis. In these cases, the third stage of general adaptive syndrome, exhaustion, occurs when the body is depleted of resources and is unable to maintain normal functioning. Sympathetic nervous activation remains in the exhaustion phase and there is a marked sensitization to stress as fight-or-flight symptoms return. If the body remains in a state of stress, the more severe symptoms of CSR, such as cardiovascular and digestive involvement, may present themselves. Permanent damage to the body may occur if it remains in the exhaustion phase for an extended period of time.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-12">[13]

BICEPS
Modern front-line combat stress treatment techniques are designed to mimic the historically used PIE techniques with some modification. BICEPS is the current treatment route employed by the U.S. military and stresses differential treatment by the severity of CSR symptoms present in the service member. BICEPS is employed as a means to treat CSR symptoms and return soldiers quickly to combat.

The following BICEPS program is taken from the U.S.M.C. combat stress handbook:<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-13">[14]

Brevity
Critical Event Debriefing should take 2 to 3 hours.Initial rest and replenishment at medical CSC (Combat Stress Control) facilities should last no more than 3 or 4 days. Those requiring further treatment are moved to the next level of care. Since many require no further treatment, military commanders expect their Service members to return to duty rapidly.

Immediacy
CSC should be done as soon as possible when operations permit. Intervention is provided as soon as symptoms appear.

Centrality/Contact
Service members requiring observation or care beyond the unit level are evacuated to facilities in close proximity to, but separate from the medical or surgical patients at the BAS, surgical support company in a central location (Marines) or forward support/division support or area support medical companies (Army)nearest the service members' unit. It is best to send Service members who cannot continue their mission and require more extensive respite to a central facility other than a hospital, unless no other alternative is possible. The Service member must be encouraged to continue to think of himself as a warfighter, rather than a patient or a sick person. The chain of command remains directly involved in the Service member's recovery and return to duty. The CSC team coordinates with the unit's leaders to learn whether the overstressed individual was a good performer prior to the combat stress reaction, or whether he was always a marginal or problem performer whom the team would rather see replaced than returned. Whenever possible, representatives of the unit, or messages from the unit, tell the casualty that he is needed and wanted back. The CSC team coordinates with the unit leaders, through unit medical personnel or chaplains, any special advice on how to assure quick reintegration when the Service member returns to his unit.

Expectancy
The individual is explicitly told that he is reacting normally to extreme stress and is expected to recover and return to full duty in a few hours or days. A military leader is extremely effective in this area of treatment. Of all the things said to a Service member suffering from combat stress, the words of his small-unit leader have the greatest impact due to the positive bonding process that occurs during combat. Simple statements from the small-unit leader to the Service member that he is reacting normally to combat stress and is expected back soon have positive impact. Small-unit leaders should tell Service members that their comrades need and expect them to return. When they do return, the unit treats them as every other Service member and expects them to perform well. Service members suffering and recovering from combat stress disorder are no more likely to become overloaded again than are those who have not yet been overloaded.In fact, they are less likely to become overloaded than inexperienced replacements.

Proximity
In mobile war requiring rapid and frequent movement, treatment of many combat stress cases takes place at various battalion or regimental headquarters or logistical units, on light duty, rather than in medical units, whenever possible. This is a key factor and another area where the small-unit leader helps in the treatment. CSC and follow-up care for combat stress casualties are held as close as possible to and maintain close association with the member’s unit, and are an integral part of the entire healing process. A visit from a member of the individual’s unit during restoration is very effective in keeping a bond with the organization. A Service member suffering from combat stress reaction is having a crisis, and there are two basic elements to that crisis working in opposite directions. On the one hand, the Service member is driven by a strong desire to seek safety and to get out of an intolerable environment. On the other hand, the Service member does not want to let his comrades down. He wants to return to his unit. If a Service member starts to lose contact with his unit when he enters treatment, the impulse to get out of the war and return to safety takes over. He feels that he has failed his comrades and they have already rejected him as unworthy. The potential is for the Service member to become more and more emotionally invested in keeping his symptoms so he can stay in a safe environment. Much of this is done outside the Service member's conscious awareness, but the result is the same. The more out of touch the Service member is with his unit, the less likely he will recover. He is more likely to develop a chronic psychiatric illness and get evacuated from the war. This is one of the essential principles of CSC.

Simplicity
Treatment is kept very simple. CSC is not therapy. Psychotherapy is not done. The goal is to rapidly restore the Service member’s coping skills so that he functions and returns to duty again. Sleep, food, water, hygiene, encouragement, work details, and confidence-restoring talk are often all that is needed to restore a Service member to full operational readiness. This can be done in units in reserve positions, logistical units or at medical companies. Every effort is made to reinforce Service members’ identity. They are required to wear their uniforms and to keep their helmets, equipment, chemical protective gear, and flak jackets with them. When possible, they are allowed to keep their weapons after the weapons have been cleared. They may serve on guard duty or as members of a standby quick reaction force.

Screening
Historically, screening programs that have attempted to preclude soldiers exhibiting personality traits thought to predispose them to CSR have been a total failure. Part of this failure stems from the inability to base CSR morbidity off of one or two personality traits. Full psychological work-ups are expensive and inconclusive, while pen and paper tests are ineffective and easily faked. In addition, studies conducted following WWII screening programs showed that psychological disorders present during military training did not accurately predict stress disorders during combat.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-14">[15]

Cohesion
While it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of such a subjective term, soldiers who reported in a WWII study that they had a "higher than average" sense of comradery and pride in their unit were more likely to report themselves ready for combat and less likely to fall victim to CSR or other stress disorders. Soldiers with a "lower than average" sense of cohesion with their unit were more susceptible to stress illness.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-15">[16]

Training
Stress Exposure Training or SET is a common component of most modern military training. There are three steps to an effective stress exposure program.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-16">[17] Soldiers with a knowledge of both the emotional and physical signs and symptoms of CSR are much less likely to have a critical event that reduces them below fighting capability. Instrumental information, such as breathing exercises that can reduce stress and suggestions not to look at the faces of enemy dead, is also effective at reducing the chance of a breakdown.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-17">[18] Cognitive control strategies can be taught to soldiers to help them recognize stressful and situationally detrimental thoughts and repress those thoughts in combat situations. Such skills have been shown to reduce anxiety and improve task performance.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-18">[19] Soldiers who feel confident in their own abilities and those of their squad are far less likely to suffer from combat stress reaction. Training in stressful conditions that mimic those of an actual combat situation builds confidence in the abilities of themselves and the squad. As this training can actually induce some of the stress symptoms it seeks to prevent, stress levels should be increased incrementally as to allow the soldiers time to adapt.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-19">[20] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-20">[21]
 * Providing Knowledge of the Stress Environment
 * Skills Acquisition
 * Confidence Building Through Application and Practice

Treatment Results
Figures from the 1982 Lebanon war showed that with proximal treatment 90% of CSR casualties returned to their unit, usually within 72 hours. With rearward treatment only 40% returned to their unit. It was also found that treatment efficacy went up with the application of a variety of front line treatment principles versus just one treatment.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Gabriel_10-1">[11] In Korea, similar statistics were seen, with 85% of US battle fatigue casualties returned to duty within three days and 10% returned to limited duties after several weeks.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-web.archive.org_9-1">[10] Though these numbers seem to promote the claims that proximal PIE or BICEPS treatment is generally effective at reducing the effects of combat stress reaction, other data suggests that long term PTSD effects may result from the hasty return of effected individuals to combat. Both PIE and BICEPS are meant to return as many soldiers as possible to combat, and may actually have adverse effects on the long term health of service members who are rapidly returned to the front-line after combat stress control treatment. Although the PIE principles were used extensively in the Vietnam War, the post traumatic stress disorder lifetime rate for Vietnam veterans was 30% in a 1989 US study and 21% in a 1996 Australian study. In a study of Israeli Veterans of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 37% of veterans diagnosed with CSR during combat were later diagnosed with PTSD, compared with 14% of control veterans.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-MEDLINE_21-0">[22]

Controversy
There is significant controversy with the PIE and BICEPS principles. Throughout a number of wars, but notably during the Vietnam War, there has been a conflict amongst doctors about sending distressed soldiers back to combat. During the Vietnam War this reached a peak with much discussion about the ethics of this process. Proponents of the PIE and BICEPS principles argue that it leads to a reduction of long-term disability but opponents argue that combat stress reactions lead to long-term problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder. The use of psychiatric drugs to treat victims of CSR has also come under fire, as some military psychiatrists have come to question the efficacy of such drugs on the long term health of veterans. Concerns have been expressed as to the effect of pharmaceutical treatment on an already elevated substance abuse rate among former CSR sufferers.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-22">[23] Recent research has caused an increasing number of scientists to believe that there may be a physical (i.e., neurocerebral damage) rather than psychological basis for blast trauma. As traumatic brain injury and combat stress reaction have very different causes yet result in similar neurologic symptoms, researchers emphasize the need for greater diagnostic care.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-23">[24]