King George V class battleship (1939)

The King George V-class battleships were the most modern British battleships used during World War II. Five ships of this class were commissioned:  King George V  (1940),  Prince of Wales  (1941),  Duke of York  (1941),  Howe  (1942) and  Anson  (1942).

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited all of the number, displacement, and armaments of warships built following its ratification, and this was extended by the First London Naval Treaty but these treaties were due to expire in 1936. With increased tension between Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy, it was supposed by the designers of these battleships that the treaty might not be renewed and the ships of the King George V-class were designed with this possibility in mind.

All five battleships served during World War II, with Prince of Wales and King George V being heavily involved in the pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck between 24 and 26 May 1941. Prince of Wales was later sunk by a Japanese air attack during her deployment to Singapore off the eastern coast of Malaya along with the battlecruiser HMS Repulse, making her the only ship of the class to be lost in combat. In 1943 Duke of York played a key role in sinking the German battleship  Scharnhorst  this battle was also the last time that British and German capital ships fought each other during World War II. Howe and Anson had less notable careers as most of their careers were spent in the Arctic Circle providing distant cover for the numerous convoys to and from Russia. The four remaining ships would all be deployed to the Pacific but Duke of York and Anson would both arrive too late to take part in hostilities, whilst King George V and Howe would both provide off-shore bombardment against such targets as the Ryukyu Islands. Following the end of World War II, the ships were slowly phased out of service and by 1957 all of the ships had been sold off for scrap a process that was completed by numerous ship breakers between 1957 and 1958. {| class="toc" id="toc"

Contents
[hide] *1 Design and description
 * 1.1 Propulsion
 * 1.2 Protection
 * 1.2.1 Underwater protection
 * 1.3 Armament
 * 1.3.1 Main armament
 * 1.3.2 Secondary armament
 * 1.3.3 Anti-aircraft battery
 * 1.3.4 Fire control
 * 2 Ships
 * 3 Service histories
 * 3.1 King George V
 * 3.2 Prince of Wales
 * 3.3 Duke of York
 * 3.4 Howe
 * 3.5 Anson
 * 4 References
 * 5 External links
 * }

Design and description
The King George V class was the result of a design process that began in 1928. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, a "holiday" from building capital ships was placed in force through 1931. The battleships of the British Navy consisted of only those old battleships that had been kept after the end of World War I, plus the two new but slow Nelson-class battleships. In 1928, the Royal Navy started considering the requirements for the warships that it expected to start building in 1931.[2]

The First London Naval Treaty of 1930 extended the "shipbuilding holiday" through 1937. Planning began again in 1935, drawing on previous design work. The new class would be built up to the Treaty maximum displacement of 35,000 tons. Alternatives with 16-inch, 15-inch and 14-inch main guns were considered and the 15-inch armament was chosen. Most designs were intended to steam at 27 knots with full power, and it was decided that the likely decisive range in a battle would be from 12,000 to 16,000 yards. Armour and torpedo protection formed a much greater portion of the design than that of the previous Royal Navy battleships.[3]

In October 1935, the decision was made to use 14-inch guns. At the time, the United Kingdom was negotiating for a continuation of the Naval Treaties with the other parties of the London Treaty. The British Government favoured a reduction in the maximum calibre of battleship gun to 14 inches and in early October, the government learned that the United States of America would support this position if the Japanese could also be persuaded to do so. Since the large naval guns needed to be ordered by the end of the year, the British Admiralty decided on 14-inch guns for the King George V-class.[3] The Second London Naval Treaty, a result of the Second London Naval Conference begun in December 1935, was signed in March 1936 by the United States, France and Britain and this set a main battery of 14-inch naval guns as the limit. The Japanese Empire left the conference in January and the Italian government of Benito Mussolini refused to sign the treaty.[4]

Propulsion
The King George Vs were the first British battleships to alternate engine rooms and boilers in the machinery spaces, which reduced the likelihood of one hit causing the loss of all power.[5] The machinery was arranged in four engine (turbine) rooms and four boiler rooms, with the 8 machinery compartments alternating in pairs of engine or boiler rooms. Each pair of boiler rooms formed a unit with a pair of engine rooms. Nominal full power was 110,000 shaft horsepower at 230 rpm with 400 pounds per square inch (28 bar) steam at 700 °F (371 °C).[6] The machinery was designed to operate at an overload power of 125,000 shp[7] and Prince of Wales ' "...main machinery steamed at overload powers of 128,000 to 134,000 shaft horsepower with no difficulties..."[8] during the hunt for the Bismarck. The Admiralty boilers operated very efficiently and similar boilers of nearly identical power, fitted to  Warspite  during her rebuilding in 1937, achieved a full power specific fuel consumption[Note 1] of 0.748 lb per shp on trials which compared favourably with contemporary battleships.[9] [10] After 1942 the Royal Navy was forced to use fuel oils with considerably higher viscosity and greater seawater content than these boilers could efficiently use.[11] The poor quality of the oil fuel combined with the seawater contamination to reduce the efficiency of the steam power plant and increased the maintenance required.[12] By 1944 the specific full power fuel consumption had increased to 0.8 lb per shp and boiler maintenance was becoming increasingly difficult.[13] The Admiralty had been aware of this problem and were designing new types of oil sprayers and burners that could burn the available fuel oil much more efficiently, and sometime after 1944,[14] Duke of York and Anson were fitted with new, higher pressure, oil sprayers and burners that restored the boilers to full efficiency.[13] These same oil sprayers and burners were used in  Vanguard  along with other detail improvements so that Vanguard achieved a full power specific fuel consumption of 0.63 lb per shp<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-15">[15] while using the same steam pressures and temperatures as used on the KGV class.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-16">[16]

Protection
The external vertical armour belt is clearly visible here on HoweThe armour protection of the King George V-class battleships was designed after consideration of the Royal Navy's experience of World War I and upon testing between the wars.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-17">[17] Magazine protection was given priority<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R415_18-0">[18] through the provision of a thick belt and deck armour and by placing the magazines at the lowest levels of the ship.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R285_19-0">[19]

The horizontal protection over the magazines consisted of three layers with a total thickness of 9.13 inches; the weather deck consisted of 1.25 inches of D steel,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-20">[20] the main armoured deck was 5.88 inches thick over a .5-inch D<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-21">[21] steel deck and above the shell rooms there was another 1.5-inch splinter deck.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R284_22-0">[22] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-23">[23] The powder magazines were below the shell rooms for added protection, a practise that was begun with the Nelson-class battleships.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R285_19-1">[19] The weatherdeck thickness was the same over the machinery spaces but there the main armoured deck was reduced to 4.88 inches over a .5-inch D steel deck. The main armoured deck was continued forward of the forward armoured bulkhead and gradually reduced from full thickness to 2.5 inches, while aft of the after magazines an armoured turtle deck covered the steering gear with 4.5–5 inches of armour whilst also providing protection along the waterline.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R284_22-1">[22]

The main armour belt was 23.5 feet (7.2 m) high and covered the hull side from the main armoured deck to finish 15 feet (4.6 m)<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R415_18-1">[18] below the deep waterline.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-24">[24] Post-World War I studies had indicated that it was possible for delayed-action AP shells to dive under a shallow belt and penetrate into vital areas of the ship and therefore the main belt was made to extend as far below the waterline as possible.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-25">[25] Along the ship, the belt started just forward of the forward turret and finished just aft of the aft turret. The belt was at its thickest above and at the waterline. Along the magazines, the belt was 15 inches thick (381 mm);<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-26">[26] over the machinery spaces, the belt was 14 inches (356 mm). The lower section of belt tapered to a thickness of between 4.5 in and 5.5 in.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-B2829_2-2">[3] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-27">[27] Armour protection was even better than the thickness of armour would indicate due to the improved qualities of the cemented<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-28">[28] armour which provided excellent resistance.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-29">[29] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-30">[30] The armoured belt, together with armoured bulkheads fore and aft and the armoured main deck, formed an "armoured citadel" protecting magazines and machinery. The armoured bulkhead was 12 in (305 mm) thick forward and 10 in (254 mm) thick at the after end of the citadel<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R284_22-2">[22] The main armoured belt extended forward and aft of the main armoured bulkheads with reduced height to protect the waterline and gradually reduced in thickness from 13 to 5.5 inches.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R284_22-3">[22] Immune zone calculations vary wide from source to source.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-31">[31] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-32">[32] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-33">[33] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-34">[34]

The main gun turrets were relatively lightly protected in comparison to contemporary battleships.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G252255_35-0">[35] Maximum turret and barbette armour was reduced to 12.75 inches in this class from the 16 inches of the Nelson class. The turret faces had 12.75 in (324 mm) of armour at the front; 8.84 inches (225 mm) sides (at the gun chamber); 6.86 inches (284–174 mm) on the sides and rear; the roof plate was 5.88 in (149 mm) thick. The main armament barbettes were of varying thickness: 12.75 in (324 mm) thick on the sides, 11.76 in (298 mm) forward and 10.82 in (275 mm) aft of the turret. To some extent the higher quality of the armour minimized the loss of protection and the turret's flat face improved ballistic resistance at long ranges, while the low profile of the turret minimized target area at closer ranges. The reduction in turret and barbette armour was a compromise in favour of the thickest possible protection for the magazines.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R415_18-2">[18] The extensive anti-flash protection in the turrets and barbettes was designed to ensure that the magazines would remain safe even if the turrets and/or barbettes were penetrated.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R285_19-2">[19] The secondary gun mounts, casements and handling rooms received only light plating of 0.98 in (25 mm) to protect against splinters.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G252255_35-1">[35] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R284_22-4">[22]

Unlike contemporary foreign battleships and the preceding Nelson-class battleships, the KGV class had comparatively light conning tower protection with 4 inches (100 mm) inches sides, 3 in (75 mm) forward and aft and a 1.47 in (38 mm) roof plate.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-36">[36] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-37">[37] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R284_22-5">[22] The RN's analysis of World War I revealed that command personnel were unlikely to use an armoured conning tower, preferring the superior visibility of unarmoured bridge positions<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R415_18-3">[18] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-38">[38] Stability and weight considerations clearly played an important part in the British decision to limit superstructure armour. The conning tower armour was sufficient to protect against smaller ship guns and shell fragments.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-39">[39]

Underwater protection
Armour and underwater protection of King George VThe hull below the waterline, along the main armour belt, formed the Side Protection System (SPS). It was subdivided into series of longitudinal compartments in a void-liquid-void layout; the outer and inner were filled with air, and the middle compartment with liquid (fuel or water). The outer hull plating in the region of the SPS was made as thin as possible to minimize splinter damage in the event of a torpedo hit. The outer compartment of the SPS was normally an empty or void space (containing only air) and this allowed the initial explosion from a torpedo to expand while minimizing damage to the ship. The centre compartment was filled with oil or seawater and this spread the pressure pulse over a larger area while the liquid contained any metal splinters that were created from the torpedo explosion. The inboard compartment was another void space and served to contain any liquid leaking from the liquid layer and any remaining pressure pulse from the torpedo explosion. Inboard of the final void space was an armoured bulkhead which varied in thickness from 1.5 in (37 mm) over the machinery spaces to 1.75 inch (44 mm) abreast of the magazines. This bulkhead formed the "holding bulkhead" and it was designed to resist the residual blast effects from the torpedo hit. If this final inner bulkhead was penetrated a further set of subdivided compartments would contain any leaks; inboard of the holding bulkhead the ship was highly subdivided into small compartments containing auxiliary machinery spaces. The SPS void-liquid-void layer was generally about 13 feet wide, and the auxiliary machinery spaces added approximately another 8 feet of space from the outer hull plating to the major machinery spaces. The only exception to this was abreast A and B Engine Rooms, where the auxiliary machinery spaces were omitted, but another void space, about three feet wide was substituted in its place.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-40">[40] Above the SPS, and directly behind the armour belt, was a series of compartments, typically used for washrooms or storage spaces, which were designed to allow for upward venting of overpressure from a torpedo hit. This scheme was designed to protect against a 1000 lb warhead, and had been tested and found effective in full-scale trials.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-41">[41] The SPS was also a key component of the ship's damage control system, as lists resulting from flooding could be corrected by counterflooding empty void spaces, and/or draining normally liquid filled compartments. In the case of the loss of the Prince of Wales these spaces were used for counterflooding to reduce list.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-42">[42]

 Prince of Wales  was sunk on 10 December 1941, from what was believed to have been hits by six aerial launched torpedoes<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-43">[43] and a 500 kg bomb. However, an extensive 2007 survey by divers of the wreck of Prince of Wales determined definitively that there had been only 4 torpedo hits.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-44">[44] Three of these four hits had struck the hull outside the area protected by the SPS. In the case of the fourth, the SPS holding bulkhead appeared intact abreast the area where the hull was hit.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-45">[45] The conclusion of the subsequent 2009 paper and analysis<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-46">[46] was that the primary cause of the sinking was uncontained flooding along "B" propeller shaft.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-47">[Note 2] The propeller shaft external shaft bracket failed, and the movement of the unsupported shaft then tore up the bulkheads all the way from the external propeller shaft gland through to B Engine Room itself. This allowed flooding into the primary machinery spaces. The damage and flooding was exacerbated by poor damage control and the premature abandonment of the after magazines and a telephone communications switchboard.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-48">[47] "B" propeller shaft had been stopped, and then restarted several minutes after being struck by a torpedo.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-49">[48] Subsequent inquiries into her loss at the time<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-50">[49] identified the need for a number of design improvements, which were implemented to a lesser or greater degree on the other four ships of the class.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-R388_51-0">[50] Ventilation and the watertightness of the ventilation system was improved, while internal passageways within the machinery spaces were redesigned and the communications system made more robust.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-52">[51] Improved propeller shaft glands and shaft locking gear was introduced.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-53">[52] Some of the supposed failures of the ship were nevertheless predicated on the assumption that a torpedo had hit and defeated the SPS at or about frame 206<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-54">[53] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-55">[54] at the same time as the hit that damaged B propeller shaft. The 2007 survey's <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-56">[55] video footage evidence showed however that the hull is basically intact in this area.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-57">[56] The inability to survey the wreck during the war no doubt frustrated efforts<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-58">[57] to arrive at a definitive cause for the loss of Prince of Wales and, subsequently, that somewhat flawed analysis<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-59">[58] has led to a number of incorrect theories regarding the reasons for the sinking being inadvertently disseminated over the years.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-60">[59]

On examination of the Prince of Wales after her encounter with the German battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser  Prinz Eugen , three damaging hits were discovered which had caused about 400 tons of water, from all three hits, to enter the ship.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-61">[60] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-62">[61] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-63">[62] One of these hits, fired from Bismarck, had penetrated the torpedo protection outer bulkhead in a region very close to an auxiliary machinery space causing local flooding within the SPS, while the inner, 1.5-inch ( 2x19 mm)<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-64">[63] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-65">[64] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-66">[65] D-steel holding bulkhead, however, remained intact, as the German shell was a dud. The German shell would have actually exploded in the water if its fuse had worked properly,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-67">[66] due to the depth which the shell had to dive before striking the Prince of Wales under her armoured belt.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-68">[67]

Main armament
British 14-inch naval gun as used on King George V-class battleships. This example, never installed, is now on display at the Royal Armoury Fort Nelson, Hampshire, UKThe King George V and the four other ships of the class as built carried ten BL 14 inch Mk VII naval guns, in two quadruple turrets fore and aft and a single twin turret behind and above the fore turret.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-69">[68] There was debate within the Admiralty over the choice of gun calibre;<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-70">[69] though there was little or no debate within Parliament;<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-71">[70] other European powers preferred 15-inch, and the USN, 16-inch main guns.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G227_72-0">[71] Initially the Admiralty studied vessels armed with a variety of differing main armament layouts including nine 15-inch (381 mm)<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-73">[72] guns in three turrets, 2 forward and 1 aft. While this was well within the capabilities of the British shipyards, the design was quickly rejected as they felt compelled to adhere to the Second London Naval Treaty signed in 1936, and there was a serious shortage of skilled technicians and ordnance designers, along with compelling pressures to reduce weight.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G175_74-0">[73] As a result, the class was designed to carry twelve 14-inch guns in three quadruple turrets and this configuration had a heavier broadside than the nine 15-inch guns. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to include this amount of firepower and the desired level of protection into a 35,000 ton displacement,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G175_74-1">[73] and the weight of the superimposed quadruple turret brought the stability of the vessel into question. In the end, the second forward turret was changed to a smaller two gun turret in exchange for better armour protection, reducing the broadside weight to below that of the nine gun arrangement.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G175_74-2">[73] The 14-inch Armour Piercing (AP) shell also carried a very large<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-75">[74] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-76">[75] bursting charge of 48.5 lb.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-77">[76] The last naval treaty had a clause that permitted a change to 16-inch guns if another signatory did not conform to it by 1 January 1937. Although they could have invoked this clause, the effect would have been to delay construction and it was considered prudent to build with 14-inch rather than find themselves without the new battleships. The U.S. opted to absorb a delay and built its ships with larger guns.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-78">[77]

In service, the quad turrets proved to be less reliable than was hoped for. Wartime haste in building, insufficient clearance between the rotating and fixed structure of the turret, insufficient full calibre firing exercises and extensive arrangements to prevent flash from reaching the magazines made it mechanically complex,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G228_79-0">[78] leading to problems during prolonged actions. Improved clearances, improved mechanical linkages, and better training<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G228_79-1">[78] led to greater reliability in the quadruple turrets but they remained controversial.

During the combat against the German battleship Bismarck, the main battery of the newly commissioned  Prince of Wales  had mechanical problems: it started to fire three-round salvos instead of five-round salvoes, and there were problems in all except for the twin "B" turret.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-80">[79] The main battery output was reduced to 74 percent during the engagement, as out of seventy-four rounds ordered fired, only fifty-five were possible.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-81">[80] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Dulin_1980._pp._189.E2.80.93190_82-0">[81] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-83">[82] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-84">[83] 'A' turret was taking in water leading to discomfort for its crew<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-85">[84] and "Y" turret jammed at salvo 20.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-Dulin_1980._pp._189.E2.80.93190_82-1">[81] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-86">[85] The number of known defects in the main armament that was hampering 14-inch fire, the damage sustained and the worsening tactical situation forced Captain Leach to disengage from combat.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-87">[86] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-88">[87] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-89">[88] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-90">[89] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-91">[90] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-92">[91] With the range down to 14,500 yards and with five of his 14-inch guns out of action, Leach decided to break off his engagement with a superior enemy.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-93">[92] Roskill in the War at Sea, volume 1, describes the decision to turn away: "In addition to the defective gun in her forward turret another 4 gun turret was temporarily incapacitated by mechanical breakdowns. In these circumstances Leach decided to break off the action and, at 0613, turned away under cover of smoke."<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-94">[93] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-95">[94] During the later action with Bismarck,  King George V  was also having trouble with her main battery, and by 0927 every gun missed at least one salvo due to failures in the safety interlocks for antiflash protection.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-96">[95] John Roberts wrote of main gunnery problems encountered by King George V:  At 0847 Rodney opened fire...at a gun range of 23500 yards, followed by King George V one minute later at 24,600 yards...<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-97">[96] Initially she [KGV] did well achieving 1.7 salvoes per minute while employing radar control but she began to suffer severe problems from 0920 onward [Note: KGV had opened fire at 0848 and fired for about 25 minutes at 1.7 salvoes per minute until 0913, when the type 284 radar broke down, but with no recorded loss of 14 inch gun output until 0920.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-John_Roberts_p_28_98-0">[97] ]. KGV recorded 14 straddles out of 34 salvoes fired from 0853 to 0913, when using her type 284 radar for ranging and spotting.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-99">[98] 'A' turret was completely out of action for 30 minutes [From 0920<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-100">[99] ], after firing about 23 rounds per gun, due to a jam between the fixed and revolving structure in the shell room and Y turret was out of action for 7 minutes due to drill errors. . . Both guns in B turret, guns 2 and 4 in A turret and gun 2 in Y turret were put out of action by jams and remained so until after the action – 5 guns out of 10! There were a multitude of other problems with mechanical failures and drill errors that caused delays and missed salvos. There were also some misfires – one gun (3 of A turret) misfired twice and was out of action for 30 minutes before it was considered safe to open the breech.
 * —John Roberts, The Final Action<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-John_Roberts_p_28_98-1">[97]

During the early part of her action against the Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943,  Duke of York  scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. "However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-101">[100] The KGVs were the only British battleships to use the 14-inch guns and turrets; their planned successors, free of treaty limitations, were to use a new 16-inch gun and triple mounts.

Secondary armament
Secondary battery 5.25-inch dual purpose turret of King George VThe QF 5.25 inch Mark I dual purpose gun has been dogged with controversy as well. The RN Gunnery Pocket Book published in 1945 states that: "The maximum rate of fire should be 10–12 rounds per minute.".<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-102">[101] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-103">[102] Wartime experience revealed that the maximum weight which the loading numbers could handle comfortably was much lower than 80–90 lb, and the weight of the 5.25-inch ammunition caused serious difficulties, allowing them to manage only 7–8 rpm instead of the designed 10–12 rpm.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-104">[103] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-MediumRN_105-0">[104] The mount had a maximum elevation of +70 degrees.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-MediumRN_105-1">[104] The slow elevating and training speeds of the mounts were inadequate for engaging modern high-speed aircraft.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-106">[105] Despite these issues, Prince of Wales was credited with several 5.25-inch kills during Operation Halberd,<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-107">[106] and damaged 10 of 16<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-108">[107] high level bombers in two formations during her last engagement, two of which subsequently crash landed.  Anson  had her 5.25-inch turrets upgraded to RP10 control<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-109">[108] which increased training and elevating speeds to 20 degrees per second.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-110">[Note 3] These ships were equipped with the HACS AA fire control system and the Admiralty Fire Control clock for surface fire control of the secondary armament.

Anti-aircraft battery
The King George V-class design had four 0.5-inch quadruple machine gun mounts, but in 1939 these were replaced by two Mark VI pom-pom mounts. In 1940, to combat air attack, four Unrotated Projectile mountings were fitted, one on "B" turret, two on "Y" turret, and one replaced a pom-pom mount added in 1939 at the stern. The pom-poms mounted in the King George V were designed and produced by Vickers Armstrongs as a result of a post-World War I requirement for a multiple mounting which was effective against close-range bombers or torpedo planes. The first model, tested in 1927, was superior to anything developed in other countries at the time and in 1938 the Mark VI* had a muzzle velocity of 2,400 feet per second, a 1.594-inch bore and a barrel length of 40 calibres. They fired a 1.8-pound shell at a rate of 96–98 rounds per minute for controlled fire and 115 rounds per minute for automatic fire.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C71_111-0">[109] The range of the Mark VI* was 6,800 yards, at a muzzle velocity of 2,300 feet per second.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C71_111-1">[109] The Mark VI octuple mount weighed 16 tons. The Mark VII quadruple mount weighed 10.8 tons if power operated; it could be elevated to 80 degrees and depressed to 10 degrees at a rate of 25 degrees per second which was also the rate of train. The normal ammunition supply on board for the Mark VI was 1,800 rounds per barrel.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G229_112-0">[110] King George V introduced the Mk IV Pom-pom director to the Royal Navy in 1940, becoming the first ship in the world to feature gyroscopic target tracking in tachymetric anti-aircraft directors.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-113">[111] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-114">[112]

Fire control
The main guns of the King George V-class ships were controlled via two director control towers, one on top of the bridge superstructure and one aft of the mainmast, each of the control towers were equipped with 15ft rangefinders and fed targeting information to an Admiralty Fire Control Table, Mk IX. In the event that the control towers were disabled both "A" and "Y" turrets had internal 41ft rangefinders whilst "B" turret had 30ft rangefinders. The first two ships of the class to be completed, King George V and Prince of Wales, carried four HACS Mk IVGB directors for the ship's secondary 5.25-inch guns as well as six Mk IV pom-pom directors; all ten of these directors featured Gyro Rate Unit, tachymetric fire control. Whilst the Duke of York and Howe had HACS Mk V directors, with Anson having the Mk V directors replaced for the updated Mk VI.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-115">[113]

King George V
Upon completion on 11 December 1940 she joined the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow. In February 1941 King George V provided distant cover for Operation Claymore as well as escorting Atlantic convoys, HX 114 and HX 115 during March.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C7_117-0">[114] Following this, King George V on 22 May was sent to Iceland to help locate the Bismarck and on the morning of 24 May when Prince of Wales and Hood engaged Bismarck, King George V was still 300 to 400 miles away and as such could not help in the engagement.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G209_118-0">[115] At 10:30 on 26 May, Bismarck was spotted by a Catalina flying boat of the RAF and the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal launched an air attack and at 22:25 her torpedo bombers damaged Bismarck slowing her down and jamming her rudder.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G209_118-1">[115] By 08:43 King George V had sighted the Bismarck; Rodney opened fire four minutes later with King George V following suit a minute later at a range of 24,600 yards (22,500m). By 08:59 King George V closed to 16,000 yards (14,600m), leading the Bismarck to concentrate all of her remaining guns onto King George V, but the fire was inaccurate and King George V was not hit. At 09:02 a shell from either King George V or Rodney hit the Bismarck and at 09:08 another hit disabled the hydraulic machinery in Bismarck's turrets "Anton" and "Bruno", forcing both turrets to cease fire; by 09:13 Bismarck's forward and after Fire Control Directors were disabled and by 09:31 Bismarck was completely silenced.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-119">[116] From 09:20, 32 minutes after opening fire, King George V began to have severe problems with her main battery but still managed to fire a total of 335 14-inch (35cm) shells during the action, compared to 380 16-inch (38cm) shells fired by Rodney. After Bismarck's sinking, owing to Rodney and King George V being low on fuel, they were ordered back to port, escorted by eleven destroyers to guard against German air or submarine attack.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G214_120-0">[117]

After the action against Bismarck, King George V operated with the Home Fleet on a variety of missions such as Operation EJ in October, which involved escorting Victorious, whose aircraft attacked German shipping in the Glomfjord.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-121">[118] Following this she covered convoys to Russia and on 1 May 1942 she was operating with the USS Washington as an escort to convoy PQ 15, when she collided with the destroyer HMS Punjabi which had manoeuvred to avoid a mine and crossed King George V bow in a dense fog. Punjabi was cut in two and King George V had 40 feet of her bow badly damaged which resulted in King George V being sent to Gladstone Dock in Liverpool for repairs on 9 May and returning to Scapa Flow on 1 July 1942 to resume convoy escort duty.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G214_120-1">[117]

In May 1943, King George V was moved to Gibraltar in preparation for Operation Husky along with her sister-ship Howe. The two ships bombarded Trapani on 12 July and helped to defend against an air raid in Algiers prior departing for Operation Avalanche. Between 9 to 11 September, King George V provided support for Operation Slapstick and later escorted the surrendered part of the Italian fleet, including the battleships Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C7_117-1">[114] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C10_122-0">[119] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G214_120-2">[117] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-123">[120] 

In late March 1945, King George V began operations in the Pacific as part of Task Force 57 which included Howe, the aircraft carriers Illustrious, Indomitable, Indefatigable and Victorious, four cruisers and ten destroyers. On 4 May 1945, King George V led battleships and cruisers in a forty-five minute bombardment of Japanese air facilities in the Ryukyu Islands. In mid-July King George V was dispatched to join US battleships in a bombardment of industrial installations at Hitachi with King George V firing 267 rounds from her 14-inch guns during this operation. She fired her guns in anger for the last time in a night bombardment of Hamamastu on 29 and 30 July 1945. Following the end of the war, King George V became the flagship of the Home Fleet until December 1946 when she became a training vessel. In 1957 it was decided that she should be scrapped and this was done by Arnott Young and Co. in Dalmuir.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C10_122-1">[119] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G215_124-0">[121]

Prince of Wales
Upon completion in 1941, Prince of Wales along with the battlecruiser Hood and six destroyers were ordered to intercept the German battleship Bismarck if she attempted to break out of the Atlantic.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G177-179_125-0">[122] At 05:33 on 24 May contact was made with the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen and Prince of Wales opened fire on Bismarck at 26,000 yards (23,800m), however, the initial salvos were over by approximately 1,000 yards (900m) as the neither the turret rangefinders nor the 15-foot (4.5m) control tower rangefinders could be used owing to the spray over the bow and poor visibility. Additionally, for reasons which have never been fully understood, both of Prince of Wales gunnery radar systems ( Type 284 and Type 281) failed to provide any usable ranges during the action; instead fire was directed from the control tower using estimated ranges based upon Bismarck's apparent height.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-126">[123] Prince of Wales sixth salvo straddled Bismarck and it was during this salvo that Prince of Wales landed her first of two decisive hits on Bismarck as one shell holed her bow and caused her to lose 1,000 tons of fuel oil, with the other shell entering Bismarck below her side armour belt and flooding her auxiliary boiler machinery room and forcing the crucial shutdown of two boilers which led to Bismarck making the ill-fated decision to attempt to return to port.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G177-179_125-1">[122] During this time the German ships concentrated their fire on Hood leading to her sinking at 06:01 with the loss of all but three of her 1,419 officers and men. At 06:02 Prince of Wales was hit by a 15-inch shell that entered the compass platform and killed the majority of personal there, however, Captain Leach was unhurt.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G179_127-0">[124] At 06:05 Captain Leach decided to disengage and laid down a heavy smokescreen to cover Prince of Wale's retreat. At 18:16, Prince of Wales fired twelve salvos against the Bismarck at the extreme range of 30,300 yards (27,700m) and owing to this distance failed to land any hits. At 01:31 on 25 May Prince of Wales reengaged Bismarck with five salvos fired at an opening range of 20,000 yards (18,300m), using radar ranges, but landed no hits; shortly after this engagement contact was lost with Bismarck although Prince of Wales continued to search for Bismarck she was soon was forced to head for Iceland to refuel and would take no further part in actions against the Bismarck.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-128">[125] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-129">[126] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G180_130-0">[127] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-131">[128]

After being repaired at Rosyth, Prince of Wales transported Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Newfoundland to attend a conference with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt during this conference the two leaders proclaimed the Atlantic Charter which laid out how the allies would deal with the post-war world.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C12_132-0">[129] Following this, Prince of Wales on 24 September along with numerous other ships provided escort for Operation Halberd. On 27 September the convoy was attacked by Italian aircraft with Prince of Wales shooting down several aircraft with her 5.25-inch (133 mm) guns.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-133">[130] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C12_132-1">[129]

On 25 October 1941, Prince of Wales departed home waters bound for Singapore, with orders to rendezvous with the battlecruiser Repulse and the aircraft carrier Indomitable, however, Indomitable ran aground in Jamaica and was unable to proceed. On 2 December the group docked in Singapore and Prince of Wales then became the flagship of the ill-fated force Z under Vice-Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. On 9 December the force received orders to commence hostilities against the Japanese convoys that operated in the area.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C12-13_134-0">[131] The force then diverted to Malaya as they had received intelligence that Japanese forces were landing their, however, this was a diversion and at 02:11 10 December the force was spotted by a Japanese submarine.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C12-13_134-1">[131] At 11:00 the first Japanese air attack began against the force and at 11:30 Prince of Wales was struck by a torpedo, with Repulse managing to avoid all seven torpedo's aimed at her. The torpedo that struck Prince of Wales proved to be fatal as it wrecked the outer propeller shaft on the port aft side as well as destroying bulkheads along the shaft up to B Engine Room.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C13_135-0">[132] This led to rapid flooding and she began to take on a heavy list. Repulse after managing to avoid being hit by a third torpedo attack was to see her luck run out and she was hit several times in a forth attack and sank at 12:33. The aircraft then turned their attention to Prince of Wales and she was hit by three more torpedo's before a 500 kilogram (1100lb) bomb hit the catapult deck, penetrating through to the main deck before exploding in the make shift aid center causing numerous casualties. Several other bombs from this attack were very "near misses", which indented the hull, popped rivets and caused hull plates to "split" along their seams which further intensified the flooding aboard Prince of Wales. At 13:15 the order was given to abandon ship and at 13:20 Prince of Wales capsized and sank with Vice-Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach being among the 327 fatalities.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C13_135-1">[132] The wreck lies upside down in 223 feet (68 m) of water at  WikiMiniAtlas 3°33′36″N 104°28′42″E﻿ / ﻿3.56°N 104.47833°E ﻿ / 3.56; 104.47833 and following the raising of the ships bell in 2002 by British technical divers Gavin Haywood and George McClure the ship's bell is on permanent display in the Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-136">[133]

Duke of York
Gun crews of Duke of York under the ship's 14 inch guns at Scapa Flow after the sinking of the German battleship Scharnhorst on 26 December 1943.Upon completion on 4 November 1941, Duke of York in mid-December 1941, embarked Prime Minister, Winston Churchill for a trip to the United States to confer with President Franklin D. Roosevelt.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G216_137-0">[134] Following this trip on 1 March 1942 she provided close escort for convoy PQ 12, and on 6 March this force was bolstered by Duke of York's sister-ship King George V as Admiral John Tovey believed that the German battleship Tirpitz might attempt to intercept the convoy. However, Tirpitz was prevented from reaching the convoy by aircraft from HMS Victorious.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-G216_137-1">[134] In October 1942, Duke of York was sent to Gibraltar as the new flagship of Force H and helped support the Allied landings in North Africa in November.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-138">[135] On 14 March 1943 Duke of York resumed her status as flagship of the Home Fleet following King George V and Howe's departure for Operation Husky and in June 1943 Duke of York took part in Operation Gearbox which was designed to draw attention away from Operation Husky.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C14_139-0">[136] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C14_139-1">[136] On 4 October, Duke of York and Anson covered a force of Allied cruisers and destroyers and the American carrier  Ranger  that raided German shipping off Norway. These attacks sank four merchant ships and badly damaged another seven.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-140">[137]

In 1943 following the German battleship Scharnhorst relocating to Norway it was deemed necessary for all convoys bound for Russia to heavily protected by the ships of the Home Fleet. On 25 December 1943, Scharnhorst was reported at sea and contact was made by Force 1 cruisers, Belfast, Norfolk and Sheffield, however, by 9:30 following a brief engagement Scharnhorst had outdistanced her pursuers.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-141">[138] Meanwhile, Force 2, including the Duke of York was closing distance to Scharnhorst so that Scharnhorst was detected at 45,000 yards (41,500m) by Type 273 radar, and by 16:32 a Type 284 range was obtained at a distance of 29,700 yards (27,200m); by 16:50 Duke of York had closed to 12,000 yards (11,000m) when she fired a full ten-gun broadside that scored one hit. Scharnhorst despite being under heavy fire straddled Duke of York multiple times, throughout the action, and scored two hits over the course of the entire engagement, both through Duke of York's masts; one of which severed vital radar leads. At 16:55 Duke of York silenced Scharnhorst's turrets Anton and Bruno. Nevertheless, despite this damage, Scharnhorst maintained speed and by 18:24 had opened the range between the two ships to 21,400 yards (19,500m), after which Duke of York ceased fire, having fired fifty-two broadsides. Unfortunately for Scharnhorst, but luckily for Duke of York, one shell from the final salvos had hit and exploded in Scharnhorst's number one boiler room, slowing Scharnhorst, and allowing the pursuing destroyers to overtake Scharnhorst.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-142">[139] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-143">[140] Following this, Force 2's destroyers then attacked with torpedoes, firing 28 in total, which scored 3 hits to significantly slow Scharnhorst so that by 19:01 Duke of York was again able to open fire at a range of 10,400 yards(9,500m). By 19:16 all of Scharnhorsts main turrets had been silenced, allowing Duke of York to cease fire at 19:30, and the destroyers were then ordered to close and finish the Scharnhorst with torpedoes. At 19:45 Scharnhorst sank with loss of over 1,700 men.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-144">[141] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-145">[142] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-146">[143]

Following this action, Duke of York on 29 March 1944 along with the rest of the Home Fleet provided cover for convoy JW 58<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-147">[144] and in August provided cover for aircraft carriers conducting air strikes against the Tirpitz.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-148">[145] Duke of York was then ordered to join the British Pacific Fleet but electrical problems delayed her arrival and by the time she arrived in Sydney on 29 July, she was too late to take any part in hostilities. Along with King George V, Duke of York was present in Tokyo Bay for the surrender of Japanese forces.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-149">[146] After returning to Britain she was made flagship of the Home Fleet until April 1949 and on 18 Mar 1957 she was ordered to be scrapped and was broken up by Shipbreaking Industries, Ltd, in Faslane.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-150">[147] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-151">[148]

Howe
Upon completion on 29 August 1942 Howe was placed into the Home fleet to help provide cover for convoys bound for Russia. On 31 December 1942 Howe along with King George V provided distant cover for convoy RA. 51 as well as providing cover for convoy RA.53 on 1 March 1943.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-152">[149] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-153">[150] Following this, Howe was relocated to Gibraltar along with King George V to take party in Operation Husky, the two ships shelled Trapani naval base and Favignana during 11–12 July.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-154">[151] The pair also provided cover during Operation avalanche beginning on 7 September and on 14 September Howe and King George V escorted the surrendered Italian battleships Vittorio Veneto and Italia to Alexandria.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-155">[152] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-156">[153] On 1 April 1945, Howe along with Task Force 113 was provided off-shore bombardment in support of Operation Iceberg. During this operation the force came under attack by sporadic Japanese kamikaze attacks, however, Howe was unscathed and succeeded in shooting down a kamikaze plane. Following these actions in the Pacific, Howe returned to Portsmouth in January 1946 where she was to spend the remainder of her career until she was ordered scrapped in 1957 and on 27 May 1958 she was towed to Inverkeithing to be broken up by T. W. Ward and Co.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-157">[154]

Anson
Upon completion in 1942, Anson like Howe would spend most of her career covering convoys bound for Russia. On 12 September 1942, Anson along with Duke of York provided distant cover for convoy QP. 14 and on 29 December 1942 Anson provided cover for Convoy JW.51B.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-158">[155] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-159">[156] On 29 January 1943 Anson covered her last convoy before being relocated to the Mediterranean which was Convoy RA.52.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-160">[157] In July 1943 Anson took part in diversionary moves designed to draw attention away from Operation Husky.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C15_161-0">[158] In 1944 Anson provided cover for the aircraft carrier HMS Furious whilst it carried out air strikes against German targets in Norway as part of Operation Bayleaf and on 3 April she provided cover for Operation Tungsten, which succeeded in damaging the German battleship Tirpitz.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C15_161-1">[158] <sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-162">[159] Following this, Anson along with her remaining sister-ships where sent to the Pacific but unlike her sister-ships she did not fire her guns in anger, on 15 August Anson along with Duke of York accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces occupying Hong Kong and she was also present during the official Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. After hostilites ended Anson briefly served as the flagship of the 1st Battle Squadron of the British Pacific Fleet and helped to re-occupy Hong Kong.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-C15_161-2">[158] In November 1949 Anson was placed into reserve and in 1957 she was purchased for scrap by Shipbreaking Industries, Faslane.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-163">[160]