|Battle of West Hunan|
|Part of the Second Sino-Japanese War|
|China||Empire of Japan|
|Commanders and leaders|
| He YingqinWang Yaowu||Ichiro Banzai|
|110,000 in Hunan
200,000 in total 400 aircraft
|Casualties and losses|
| 7,737 killed11 pilots||Japanese figures: ~27,000 killed and woundedChinese claim:12,498 killed
The Battle of West Hunan (湘西會戰), also known as the Zhijiang Campaign (芷江作戰) was the Japanese invasion of west Hunan and the subsequent Chinese counterattack that occurred between 6 April and 7 June 1945, during the last months of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japanese strategic aims for this campaign were to seize Chinese airfields and secure railroads in West Hunan, and to achieve a decisive victory that their depleted land forces needed.
This campaign, if successful, would also allow Japan to attack Sichuan and eventually the Chinese war time capital Chongqing. Although they were able to make initial headways, Chinese forces were able to turn the tide and forced the Japanese into a rout, recovering a substantial amount of lost ground.
This was the last major Japanese offensive, and the last of 22 major battles during the war to involve more than 100,000 troops. Concurrently, the Chinese managed to repel a Japanese offensive in Henan and Hubei and launched a successful attack on Japanese forces in Guangxi, turning the course of the war sharply in China's favor even as they prepared to launch a full-scale counterattack across South China.
By April 1945, China had already been at war with Japan for more than seven years. Both nations were exhausted by years of battles, bombings and blockades. From 1941-1943, both sides maintained a "dynamic equilibrium", where field engagements were often, numerous, involved large numbers of troops and produced high casualty counts, but the results of which were mostly indecisive. Operation Ichi-Go in 1944 changed the status quo, as Japanese forces were able to break through the inadequate Chinese defenses and occupy most of Henan, Hunan and Guangxi, connecting Japanese-held areas from north to south in a continuous front.
However, the Japanese victory resulted in very little actual benefit for them: the operation drained Japanese manpower and a weakened Japanese army had to defend a longer front with more partisan activity in occupied areas. The opening up of north-south railway connections did little to improve Japanese logistics, for only one train ran from Guangzhou to Wuhan in April 1945, and due to fuel shortages the primary mode of transportation for Japanese troops was on foot.
On the other hand, although the Chinese government in Chongqing had lost land access to their remaining forces in Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi with their defeat in Ichi-Go, Chinese fortunes in the war improved with the retaking of north Burma by Allied and Chinese forces and since its reopening on 4 February 1945 the Ledo-Kunming Stilwell Road transported over 50,000 tonnes of petroleum into China every month. By April 1945, enough materiel had become available to the Chinese army to equip 35 divisions with American equipment. And a major counter offensive was planned.
Order of battleEdit
Japanese strategic objectivesEdit
For this campaign, the Imperial Japanese had three main objectives. The first of which was to neutralize the Chinese airfield at Chihkiang (also transliterated as Chihchiang), whose complement of USAAF and ROCAF was ensuring Allied air superiority in the region and a base for U.S. bombers, either by physically reaching the airfield, located only 435 km (270 mi) from Chungking, and securing it, or simply by pressing forward close enough to the airfield to force the Chinese to destroy the installation.
Preparations for battleEdit
By this point of the war, Japan were losing the battle in Burma and facing constant attacks from Chinese forces in the country side. Spare troops for this campaign were limited. The Japanese army began preparations for the battle in March 1945, constructing two highways with forced Chinese labor: the Heng-Shao Highway ran from Hengyang in a northwest direction to Shaoyang, a Japanese controlled city in central Hunan a mere 100 km (62 mi) from Zhijiang; and the Tan-Shao Highway from Hsiangtan, southwest to Shaoyang. Supplies and equipment were stockpiled near Shaoyang, to be the headquarters of the Japanese 20th Corps, led by Ichiro Banzai. Under it were the Japanese 34th, 47th, 64th, 68th and 116th Divisions, as well as the 86th Independent Brigade, massing at various locations across Hunan, for a total of 80,000 men by early April.
In response, the Chinese National Military Council dispatched the 4th Front Army and the 10th and 27th Army Groups with Ho Ying-chin as commander-in-chief. At the same time, it airlifted the entire New 6th Corps, an American-equipped corps and veterans of the Burma Expeditionary Force, from Kunming to Zhijiang. Chinese forces totaled 110,000 men in 20 divisions. They were supported by about 400 aircraft from the CAF 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th Air Groups and the USAAF 14th Air Force.
Japanese forces took over the outskirts of Hunan with little resistance. However, they didn't realize that the Chinese forces were well prepared for the Japanese assault. The mountainous terrain was ideal for ambushes and mortar bombardment on approaching Japanese forces in the lower grounds.
The Chinese also had air superiority in this battle. After some defeats Japan decided to retreat. However Chinese forces gave chase and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese. The local Chinese guerrilla forces then attacked the Japanese positions. Japan ended up losing a large amount of territory that they once occupied.
After the battle, Japan first announced that they only had 11,000 casualties (5,000 KIA). They later revised the figures to include an additional 15,000 casualties "due to diseases". Finally, they admitted to a casualty figure of 27,000. On the other hand, the Chinese claimed to have inflicted on the Japanese 36,358 casualties, including 12,498 KIA. The Chinese sustained (Chinese figures) 20,660 casualties with 7,817 KIA, of which there were 823 officers.
- ^ a b c d Wilson, Dick. When Tigers Fight. New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1982. pp. 248
- ^ a b http://military.china.com/zh_cn/history4/62/20050513/12309751.html
- ^ Wilson, Dick. When Tigers Fight. New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1982. pp. 246-247
- ^ Wilson, Dick. When Tigers Fight. New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1982. pp. 233
- ^ needtofindsource
- ^ a b c d e Hsu Long-hsuen, and Chang Ming-kai. History of the Sino Japanese War (1937-1945). 2nd ed. Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China: Chung Wu Publishing Co., 1972. p. 458
- ^ Kraus, Theresa L. US Army Campaigns of World War II: China Offensive. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992.
- ^ "National Revolutionary Army Order of Battle for the Battle of West Hunan". China Whampoa Academy Net. 11 September 2007 <http://www.hoplite.cn/Templates/hpjh0106.htm>.